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I. INTRODUCTION
There will never be an article about legal scholarship as good as the
three paragraph article that Arthur Leff wrote in 1981.1 Professor Leff
elegantly settles the question of what legal scholarship is and why legal
scholars (sometimes, though not always) do it.
“Legal scholarship is what legal scholars do.”2 Legal scholarship—unlike
the scholarship in other fields—comes in such a wide range of types,
styles, and methodologies that descriptions at lower levels of generalization
than Professor Leff’s necessarily turn out to be both under inclusive
* Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Finance, and Securities Regulation,
Yale Law School.
1. Arthur A. Leff, Afterword, 90 YALE L.J. 1296, 1296 (1981).
2. Id.
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(leaving out important work that is of keen interest to lawyers and law
professors) and over inclusive (capturing work that might better be
described as economics, sociology, history, or anthropology).
Moreover, Professor Leff’s succinct definition avoids the thorny
problem of figuring out whether there is anything inherently coherent in
the nature of legal scholarship. In other words, is legal scholarship a
coherent intellectual field in its own right, or is it parasitic, dependent for
its intellectual content on methodological tools borrowed from other
disciplines such as economics, history, and statistics? Put another way,
what, if anything, is distinctively “scholarly” about legal scholarship.
It turns out that figuring out why legal scholars do legal scholarship is
significantly easier than determining what legal scholarship is in the first
place. Legal scholars do legal scholarship for a multiplicity of reasons.
Perhaps most of all, legal scholars hope to experience the pure aesthetic
joy that comes from “those occasional moments when they say, in some
concise and illuminating way, something that appears to be true.”3
Beyond that, legal scholarship also is about:
[G]etting promoted, illustrating the economic rationality of the common law,
turning off the fishy stares of prolific colleagues, explaining to practitioners
what article 9 now is all about, illuminating the necessary incoherence of the
infrastructure of the late monopoly-capitalist state so as to hasten its eventual
destruction. Whatever.4

Something vaguely defined as “doctrinal analysis” traditionally formed
the core of legal scholarship. Over the years, this changed as law
schools tried to make their way up the hierarchical ladder from the status
of trade schools to professional schools and, finally, to the final rung
of the academic ladder, the status of full partner in the enterprise of the
modern American universities. The transition from trade school to
professional school is complete, but law schools have yet to secure a
permanent place on the campus of the American university. While it
seems clear that there are no great law schools that are not attached to
great universities, there are quite a few great universities (Cal Tech,
MIT, and Princeton, for example) that thrive in the absence of a resident
law school.
In addition to traditional, doctrinal scholarship, Judge Calabresi
recently proposed a useful taxonomy articulating four rival approaches
to legal scholarship, that have vied for dominance among legal scholars
in recent years.5 In addition to doctrinalism, the other approaches
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: Four Approaches to Law
and to the Allocation of Body Parts, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2113, 2113 (2003).
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identified by Calabresi include: (1) the “Law and . . .” movement, (2) the
Legal Process School, and (3) the Law and Status approach to legal
scholarship.
I argue that only one of these, the “Law and . . .” approach, has succeeded
in linking the enterprise of legal training with the larger enterprise of the
university. To the extent that either the Legal Process School, or the
Law and Status Approach has had success in forging ties between law
schools and the larger enterprise of the university, it is because these
other approaches borrow the interdisciplinary methodology of the “Law
and . . .” approach, thereby effectively collapsing themselves into the
“Law and . . .” approach.
Using my own field, corporate law, as its focal point, this Article
argues that alternative approaches to legal scholarship, whatever their
other merits, do not help connect the law school to other parts of the
universities in which they are situated, and in fact actually alienate the
law school from their more intellectually rigorous campus counterparts.
Part II of this Article discusses the various approaches to legal
scholarship that exist, with particular focus on corporate law scholarship.
Part III looks at the relationship between various law schools and the rest
of the universities in which they are contained, arguing that those law
schools with “Law and . . .” appoaches to corporate law are better integrated
in the universities of which they a part. Moreover, I argue that the trend
towards “Law and . . .” scholarship in law schools is an integral part of
law schools’ efforts to find acceptance within the university community.
University of Chicago and New York University (NYU) are good
examples of the argument being made here. At the University of Chicago,
an elite law school, “Law and . . .” scholarship long has dominated the
intellectual agenda in corporate law. The law school is well integrated
in the university, and is ranked, as an institution, at least as high as the
university as a whole. By contrast, at NYU, “Law and . . .” scholarship
competes with doctrinalism, which also, significantly is described by
Calabresi as “Autonomism”. As a consequence, the law school is not
well integrated in the university.
Interestingly, while the law school at NYU has, in recent years,
enjoyed an elite ranking, NYU as a whole has not. Of course, there are
many reasons for the university’s lack of success relative to its law
school, but the lack of connection between the law school and the rest of
the university has not helped matters. This is all by way of making the
point that, as law schools have made their way onto university
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campuses, they have often, not surprisingly, had an effect (positive or
negative) on their universities, and only rarely have they had no effect
on their universities. In Part IV, I conclude that the nature and extent of
this effect depends critically on the type of scholarship being done
within the law school.
II. APPROACHES TO LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: A BRIEF RECAP
The “Law and . . .” approach to legal scholarship has clear and
unambiguous connections to the rest of the university. Simply put, the
phrase “law and” is completed by academic disciplines such as
economics, philosophy, history, psychology, literature, anthropology, or
“any other field or combinations of fields of study for guidance in
developing a scholarly critique of the current legal landscape or of
particular parts of it.”6 The scholars who participate in the various “Law
and . . .” movements link their work directly to the work of other
university departments by unselfconsciously seeking to “find answers [to
normative legal questions] in the social sciences.”7 By contrast, the
alternative approaches to law look inward, and thereby distance
themselves from the universities in which they are situated.
The fact that these other approaches distance themselves from the
universities in which they are situated does not necessarily mean that
these approaches to law are normatively “bad” or undesirable. It means
only that, to the extent that these approaches to law are fruitful, they do
not rely on—or assist—the larger university enterprise. These rival
approaches may be highly desirable for reasons endogenous to the law.
For example, they may generate answers to important legal problems,
connect the law school more closely with the legal profession, improve
our understanding of the lawmaking process, or accomplish other
important results not directly related to the enterprise of the university.
A. Doctrinalism vs. “Law and . . .”
Doctrinalism self-consciously isolates the scholarly enterprise of the
law school from the rest of the university by construing law as
“autonomous and distinct from other fields of learning. . . . [It] can be
carried out without reference to other disciplines or other sources of
values.”8 This approach to law, historically, was dominant in America,
and is still the dominant approach in Germany, and other civil law
countries such as Italy, where law schools are—interestingly—poorly
6.
7.
8.
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integrated with the universities with which they are vaguely associated.
A particularly radical form of doctrinalism is Legal Formalism, which
not only views law as an independent discipline, but asserts that law is a
science with its own internal logic.9
Over time, Legal Formalism in its more extreme forms became
tempered. It was difficult for Legal Formalism to recruit brilliant young
scholars once alternatives emerged because it is boring and unambitious.
The job of the doctrinal scholar is to explain what the law is, ceding the
more interesting task of formulating the law entirely to others. While the
goal of making the law “more coherent and predictable”10 is laudatory, it
is not a life work that would appear to appeal to the ambitious or to those
in search of “making a difference.” Thus it is not surprising that first
legal realism, and then interdisciplinary (“Law and . . .”) scholarship
emerged as highly successful competitors to doctrinalism.
In addition, the emergence of interdisciplinary legal scholarship was a
necessary condition to law schools’ recent emergence as full citizens in
the university community. It is hard to imagine how such an emergence
would have been possible without the connective tissue that the “Law
and . . .” movement provides.
B. The Legal Process School
As Judge Calabresi has observed, the Legal Process approach engaged
in a “comparative institutional analysis” in which legal academics would
“examine courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, executives,
juries,” and other institutions involved in the production of law for the
purposes of analyzing each and deciding which institution was best
suited to make certain sorts of policy decisions.11
By focusing on institutional capability, the Legal Process school was
less inward looking, and more scientific than doctrinalism. Ultimately,
however, Legal Process scholars needed to have some framework or
basis from which to opine on the relative merits of rival institutions as
sources of legal authority. In other words, the Legal Process School was
either going to be purely descriptive, or it was going to have to turn to
outside disciplines such as sociology, economics, or public choice for
9. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9–31 (1983).
10. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 2117; Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J.
509, 540 (1988).
11. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 2123.
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guidance. As Guido Calabresi has observed, those involved in the Legal
Process school were required to choose between “turning inward (and
mirroring the doctrinalists) or outward, and seeking exogenously in other
disciplines a defense of the values and rights asserted (as would the
protagonists of [the interdisciplinary] ‘Law and . . .’ approaches).”12
The former course would have cast the Legal Formalists alongside the
doctrinalists as isolationists in the university setting. The latter course
cast the Formalists with the “Law and . . .” scholars as pulling the law
school together with the rest of the university. William Eskridge, Philip
Frickey, and Daniel Rodriguez are exemplars of the latter form of
scholarly pursuit.13 They are legal formalists whose work grounds them
firmly in the work of the rest of the university. However, their work is,
in essence, “Law and . . .” scholarship. It is linked particularly closely to
public choice, Positive Political Theory (PPT),14 and Law and Economics.
As such, when it is done in law schools, it connects the law school to the
rest of the university.
C. Law and Status
So far, it appears that doctrinalism is the only form of isolationist legal
scholarship—that is, scholarship that isolates its scholars and the
institutions in which they profess from the rest of the university. The
Legal Process school often borrows tools from other disciplines, and
when it does, it links up with the rest of the university, becoming another
variant of “Law and . . .” scholarship. In some ways, the gravitational pull
of other university departments is an even greater force on practitioners
of the Legal Process school than other “Law and . . .” approaches. I say this
because, like the Legal Process school, certain academic fields—particularly
sociology, economics, and political theory—long have focused on the
importance of institutions.
The methodology that Judge Calabresi has described as the Law and
Status approach to legal scholarship is probably the most difficult
approach to analyze.15 This approach to legal scholarship looks at the
12.
13.

Id. at 2127.
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (2d ed.
1995); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV.
919 (1989) (reviewing Eskridge and Frickey’s casebook).
14. Positive Political Theory (PPT) is a relatively new branch of political science
that uses game theory and other methods of formal modeling to study political
institutions and the production of government policy. See http://www.igs.berkeley.
edu/research_programs/ppt (last visited Sept. 14, 2004); David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey
S. Banks, Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory, 1 ANN.
REV. POL. SCI. 259–87 (1998).
15. A fascinating thing about the “Law and Status” movement is that it has
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differential effects of legal rules on particular groups from a well defined
(though often implicit) predetermined normative basis. For example,
rules that benefit or harm certain groups—such as Native Americans,
African Americans, women, or other historically disadvantaged
groups—are singled out for praise or condemnation on the basis of these
effects.16
For purposes of this Article, the critical point about the Law and
Status approach to law is that it, like the Legal Process approach, can be
doctrinal, and thus divorced from the university, or like the “Law
and . . .” approach, interdisciplinary, and thus linked to the university.
To turn again to Calabresi, the “Law and . . .” approach:
[M]ay point out, for example, how torts, taxation or property doctrines affect
women differently from men. It may use sophisticated economic analysis to
demonstrate these differences and their value consequences. It may then
describe how power was used (and by what institutions) to bring that result
about. And, finally, it may or may not leave open the question of whether the
result is good or appalling either on the basis of more general legal topography
or in terms of values derived from a particular “Law and . . .” analysis.17

In other words, Law and Status approaches to legal scholarship may
link the law schools up with the rest of the university, or they may not,
depending on whether the practitioners of these approaches rely on outside
disciplines to inform their analysis of status and its role in the law.
Interestingly, it appears that the “status” movement may be an emergent
academic approach outside of law schools. Recent sessions of the
Modern Languages Association, a group of university professors, have
focused on the role of status and the importance of status in law and
politics in the United States and other countries. The role of women has
been a particularly important aspect of this intellectual movement.
While somewhat outside of the scope of this Article, which focuses on
legal scholarship and the relations between law schools and their
universities, it is interesting to note that these Law and Status scholars,
while generally isolated from the rest of the university, often have close
ties to law schools and to legal scholars.

generated a large number of dedicated journals. See, for example, the American Indian
Law Review, the Asian Law Review, the Chicano-Latino Law Review, Hastings Women’s
Law Journal, the National Black Law Journal, and other journals. See Calebresi, supra
note 5, at n.63 (citing these and other law journals).
16. Calabresi, supra note 5, at 2127.
17. Id.
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III. LAW SCHOOLS AND THEIR UNIVERSITIES
The point of the above discussion has been to establish that legal
scholarship, whether it be overtly “Law and . . .” or interdisciplinary
manifestations of the Legal Process school or the Law and Status
approach, closely links the law schools in which its practitioners operate
together with scholars and departments in the rest of the university. By
contrast, doctrinalism, whether in its unadulterated form or as a
manifestation of the Legal Process approach or the Law and Status
approach, is isolationist in nature. Thus, it stands to reason that law schools
in which doctrinalists dominate will be relatively more isolationist than
law schools in which interdisciplinary work is dominant.
TABLE 1
1980

1990

2004
Type of Scholarship

Law School

Type of Scholarship

Type of Scholarship

1.

Berkeley

Traditional

Traditional

Mixed

2.

Chicago

Interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary

3.

Columbia

Traditional

Mixed

Interdisciplinary

4.

Cornell

Traditional

Mixed

Interdisciplinary

5.

Duke

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

6.

Georgetown

Traditional

Traditional

Mixed

7.

Harvard

Traditional

Mixed

Mixed

8.

Michigan

Traditional

Interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary

9.

NYU

Traditional

Traditional

Mixed

10. Penn
11. Stanford

Interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary

Mixed

Mixed

Interdisciplinary

12. Texas
13. USC

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

Traditional

Mixed

Interdisciplinary

Mixed

Mixed

Interdisciplinary

Mixed

Interdisciplinary

Interdisciplinary

14. Virginia
15. Yale
TOTALS:

Traditional/Mixed/Interdisciplinary
11/2/2

6/5/4

4/2/9

74%/13%/13%

40%/33%/27%

27%/13%/60%

Drawing on my own experience as a professor in the business law
area, Table 1 reports my personal views of the type of scholarship in
corporate law being done at three different points in time in fifteen wellknown law schools. While I have randomly checked these categorizations
with colleagues at various schools, all of whom wish to remain anonymous,
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the results are my sole responsibility.18
Two observations are immediately evident from this table, which I
again emphasize was constructed solely on the basis of my own
observations. First, the dominant trend over time is away from traditional,
doctrinal legal scholarship and towards interdisciplinary (“Law and . . .”)
legal scholarship. By my estimate, in 1980, 74% of the schools in my
sample were dominated by traditional legal scholarship in corporate law.
By 2004, this figure had dropped to 27%. In 1980, fully 87% of the
schools in the sample had either a traditional, doctrinal corporate law
department, or they had a mixed department comprised of both a
significant presence of interdisciplinary (“Law and . . .”) scholars and
traditional legal scholars.
Second, to test the hypothesis developed in the previous section about
links between law schools and universities, I examined the relationship
between the most recent U.S. News and World Report law school
rankings of those schools with mixed or traditional departments and the
most recent U.S. News and World Report rankings of the universities
connected with those law schools. This data is presented in Table 2.
Here one finds several interesting results.
First, consistent with the thesis presented in this article, the difference
between the average ranking of law schools with interdisciplinary
programs in corporate law, and the average rankings of their universities
was significantly narrower than the average ranking of either law
schools with mixed departments or traditional departments. Law schools
with interdisciplinary corporate law departments had an average ranking
of 7.44, while their universities had an average ranking of 14.11.19 By
contrast, law schools with mixed departments had an average ranking of
18. I also wish to observe that the categories I have chosen, “Traditional,”
“Mixed,” and “Interdisciplinary” are themselves quite subjective. For example, I have
categorized Yale Law School in 1980 as having a “mixed” corporate law group, on the
strength of the presence of that great traditionalist (and my former professor) Joseph
Bishop. See, e.g., Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968). But
at that time, Yale also had a towering law and economics scholar in the field of corporate
law, Ralph Winter, whose ariticle provides the intellectual basis for much of the
subsequent law and economics work in corporate law. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State
Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977). Hence, Yale, despite its reputation as a bastion of interdisciplinary scholarship,
was, in my view, a mixed group in corporate law as recently as 1980.
19. Of course, the average university rankings are higher than the average law
school rankings because the law schools selected will have the highest possible average
ranking {= (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 . . . 15)/15}, adjusted for ties.
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TABLE 2
U.S. News U.S. News Spread:

Business Spread:

Law School University University vs. Week
Ranking20

Ranking21 Law School

Business

Ranking22 School vs.
Law School

Berkeley

Mixed

13

21

L+7

13

0

Chicago

Interdisciplinary

6

13

L+7

2

L-4

Columbia

Interdisciplinary

4

11

L+7

7

L+3

Cornell

Interdisciplinary

12

14

L+2

11

L+1

Duke

Traditional

10

5

L-5

9

L+1

Georgetown

Mixed

14

23

L+9

30

L+6

Harvard

Mixed

2

1

L-1

3

L+1

Michigan

Interdisciplinary

7

25

L+18

8

L+1

NYU

Mixed

5

35

L+30

15

L+10

Penn

Interdisciplinary

7

5

L-2

5

L-2

Stanford

Interdisciplinary

3

5

L+2

4

L+1

Texas

Traditional

15

53

L+38

21

L+6

USC

Interdisciplinary

18

30

L+12

17

L-1

Virginia

Interdisciplinary

9

21

L+12

12

L+3

Yale

Interdisciplinary

1

3

L+2

14

L+13

Average

Average

Average

Average

Average

Law School University Difference in Business Difference in
Ranking

Ranking

Ranking

School

Ranking

(University

Ranking

(Business

vs. Law

School vs.

School):
Average Overall

8.4

17.6

9.2

Law School):
11.4

3

Ranking:
Interdisciplinary

7.44

14.11

6.67

8.88

1.44

Mixed

8.50

20.00

11.50

15.25

6.75

Traditional

12.50

29.00

16.50

15

2.5

8.50—close, but not as close to their universities’ average ranking of 20.
Finally, law schools with traditional corporate law departments had
20. Top 100 Law Schools, USNEWS.COM, at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/
grad/rankings/law/brief/lawrank_brief.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
21. National Universities–Doctoral: Top Schools (2004), USNEWS.COM, at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/college/rankings/brief/natudoc/tier1/t1natudoc_brief.php
(last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
22. 2002 Rankings and Profiles, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, at http://www.business
week.com/bschools/02/full_time_rank.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2004).
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rankings a full 16.5% different from their universities, compared with only
6.67% for “Law and . . .” departments and 11.5% for mixed departments.
Thus, consistent with the argument in this Article that law schools with
interdisciplinary approaches to law bring their law schools closer to the
universities in which they are situated—not only in intangible ways, but
also in terms of ranking—law schools with interdisciplinary corporate
law departments had rankings closer to those of the schools in which
they are situated than schools with mixed departments or doctrinalist
departments. Schools with mixed (i.e., some doctrinal scholars and
some interdisciplinary scholars) corporate law departments are closer, on
average, in their rankings to the rest of the university than schools with
purely doctrinal corporate law departments, though not as close as law
schools with exclusively interdisciplinary approaches.
Another finding that I regard as interesting, and perhaps worthy of
future exploration is that law schools inhabited exclusively by traditional
corporate law scholars are, on average, significantly better than their
universities. For example, the University of Texas Law School is ranked
15 by U.S. News and World Report, while the University of Texas is
ranked 38 places worse, at 53. A similar gap exists for New York University,
a “mixed” department, in which the university is ranked at number 30,
and the law school at number 5. Duke, the only other remaining purely
traditional department after Texas, was five points better than the rest of
the university, although there is some cause to doubt the validity of
Duke Law School’s ranking given its relative lack of prominent legal
scholars as compared with other top-ranked schools. In a recent survey
of the most cited law faculty in the United States, for example, there
were no Duke law professors among the top seventy-five.23
In any case, it appears that the decision by law schools to retain the
doctrinalist nature of their corporate law departments may be quite
rational: if, as in the case of the University of Texas, the university lags
significantly behind the rest of the university in quality, it may not be
efficient for the law school affiliated with that university to allocate
resources to recruiting interdisciplinary scholars. And it may be relatively

23. William Van Alstyne, ranked 76th, was the highest placement among the Duke
Law School faculty. To compare, the University of Virginia only had one professor
among the top seventy-five, but it had three among the top 120, whereas Duke had only one.
See Brian Leiter, Most Cited Law Faculty, at http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/
rankings02/most_cited.html (2002).
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TABLE 3
U.S. News

U.S.

Spread:

Business

Spread:

Law

News

University

Week

Business

School

University

vs. Law

Ranking26

School vs.

Ranking24

Ranking25

School

Law School

Berkeley

Mixed

13

21

L+7

13

0

Chicago

Interdisciplinary

6

13

L+7

2

L-4

Columbia

Interdisciplinary

4

11

L+7

7

L+3

Cornell

Interdisciplinary

12

14

L+2

11

L+1

Duke

Traditional

10

5

L-5

9

L+1

Georgetown

Mixed

14

23

L+9

30

L+6

Harvard

Mixed

2

1

L-1

3

L+1

Michigan

Interdisciplinary

7

25

L+18

8

L+1
L+10

NYU

Interdisciplinary

5

35

L+30

15

Penn

Interdisciplinary

7

5

L-2

5

L-2

Stanford

Interdisciplinary

3

5

L+2

4

L+1
L+6

Texas

Traditional

15

53

L+38

21

USC

Interdisciplinary

18

30

L+12

17

L-1

Virginia

Interdisciplinary

9

21

L+12

12

L+3

Yale

Interdisciplinary

1

3

L+2

14

L+13

Average

Average

Average

Average

Average

Law

University

Difference in

Business

Difference in

School

Ranking

Ranking

School

Ranking

(University

Ranking

(Business

Ranking

vs. Law

School vs

School):

Law
School):

Average

8.4

17.6

9.2

11.4

3

Overall
Ranking:
Interdisciplinary

7.20

18.0

10.8

9.5

2.30

Mixed

9.67

15.00

5.33

15.33

5.67

Traditional

12.50

29.00

16.50

15

2.50

difficult to recruit “Law and . . .” scholars to corporate law departments
of weak universities because interdisciplinary scholars will be far more
24.
25.
26.
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sensitive to university rankings than traditional legal scholars who will
be inclined to focus more on law school rankings.
I also looked at the gap between the respective rankings of universities’
law schools and their business schools. Interestingly, a very similar pattern
holds true. Law schools with interdisciplinary corporate law groups
show rankings closer to the ranking of their schools’ business schools
than other law schools. The average difference between the rankings of
law schools with interdisciplinary corporate law groups and their
business schools is 1.44%. The average difference between law schools
with mixed corporate law groups and their business schools is 6.75%.
The average difference between law schools with traditional corporate
law groups and their business schools is 2.5%.
To some extent, these results are driven by the inclusion of NYU in
the sample as a mixed school, given the large difference between the
ranking of NYU Law School and the rest of New York University.
However, this difference does not drive the result completely. For
example (see Table 3), even after taking NYU out of the group of “mixed”
corporate law faculties, and adding it to the list of Interdisciplinary (Law
and . . .) faculties, I find that interdisciplinary faculties are still on
average, closer to their business schools (2.30% different) than either
mixed (5.67%) or traditional (2.50%) faculties. However, when NYU is
recategorized as an interdisciplinary corporate law faculty, the remaining
mixed corporate law faculties (Berkeley, Georgetown, and Harvard) are,
on average, closer in ranking to the rest of their universities than other
faculties. Mixed and interdisciplinary faculties however, are still far
closer to their universities (at average differences of 15% and 18%,
respectively), than traditional faculties (with an average difference of
29%).
IV. CONCLUSION: THE LAW SCHOOLS’ “GRAVITATIONAL PULL” ON
THEIR UNIVERSITIES
It also is interesting to note that only three law schools (Chicago,
Penn, and USC) in the sample ranked worse than the business schools
within their universities, and all of these schools have interdisciplinary
law school corporate faculties.27 This makes sense, at least from the law
27. Two business schools among the top fifteen, MIT’s Sloan School, which
ranked sixth, and Dartmouth College’s Amos Tuck School of Business, which ranked
tenth, were located in a college or university without a law school. The fact that some
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schools’ perspectives. If you are running a law school that is relatively
worse than the business school in your university, it would be a smart
strategic move to leverage the quality of your business school by forging
closer ties with the business school. Having an interdisciplinary law
school corporate faculty is the obvious strategy for accomplishing this
objective.
By contrast, an apparently random selection of law schools, Duke
(traditional), Harvard (mixed) and Penn (interdisciplinary) is ranked
worse than the universities with which they are associated. This,
however, is not particularly meaningful. The difference between these
schools and their universities disappears when we adjust the list of
universities to account for the fact that several top fifteen universities
(Princeton (2), MIT (5), Cal Tech (8), Dartmouth (9), Johns Hopkins
(14), and Rice (16)) do not have law schools, and one top university,
Washington University (11), does not have a top fifteen law school.
Adjusting for this (by subtracting seven from each U.S. News university
ranking to account for the seven schools without law schools in the top
fifteen), Duke, Harvard, and Penn, of course, continue to be ranked
worse than their universities (since once a university starts out better
than its law school, the adjustment being made improves the university’s
ranking and magnifies the difference between the law school and the
university). Cornell, whose university moves up seven places from #14
to #7, moves ahead of Cornell Law School, which is ranked twelfth.
From the above analysis, it is clear that there has been a symbiotic
relationship between the aspiration of law schools to be part of the
broader university project and the growth of interdisciplinary studies.
This is especially true at law schools where being part—and sometimes,
as in the case of Chicago or Yale, a leading part—of the university to
which they belong appears to be institutionally important, not only to the
law school itself, but to the university as a whole, due to the high esteem
in which the law school is held. Where universities want to connect
their law schools with the rest of their universities, they must promote
interdisciplinary work because such interdisciplinary work is the only
way to connect the intellectual life of a law school with the intellectual
life of the rest of the university. It is unsurprising, therefore, that one
observes the greatest scholarly focus on interdisciplinary studies in the
law schools situated in strong universities. In other words, as is so often
the case, the direction of the causal connections being studied is difficult
to sort out. Does interdisciplinary work cause a law school to be great?
schools had business schools but no law schools makes the spread in the rankings
artificially higher, since, if the business school rankings were recalculated to omit these
schools, then the average ranking of each business school would be higher.
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Perhaps, but perhaps not. If we view universities as rationally selfinterested, it may be the case that universities that have great law schools
promote interdisciplinary work in those schools in order to allow
departments outside of the law school to leverage the law school’s
intellectual strength and scholarly reputation. In other words, it may not
be the case that law schools featuring excellent interdisciplinary work
just happen to be, for some as yet unarticulated reason, consistently
stronger than the universities in which they are contained.
Another way to test this hypothesis, of course, would be to look at the
way that corporate law and other courses are taught at free standing
universities, such as William Mitchell, or at law schools like Georgetown,
Northwestern, and Stetson where there is considerable physical distance
between the campus of the law school and the campus of the university.
I predict that, at schools where there is less focus on interdisciplinary
studies in the law schools, the links between the law school and the rest
of the university would be more tenuous. A logical extension of this
reasoning would be that in law schools with no attached university, or
with its affiliated university departments far away on another campus,
the difficulties in attracting strong interdisciplinary scholars would be
greater and the value added by such scholars would be significantly
reduced. As a result, it would be expected to see less interdisciplinary
work on such campuses.
To say that the relationship between interdisciplinary work and the
links between law schools and universities is symbiotic also suggests
that it is difficult to identify which way the causal link between law
school-university ties and interdisciplinary work runs. It is possible that
the growth in interdisciplinary work led to closer law school-university
ties. It is just as likely that the promotion of law school-university ties
led to the explosion in interdisciplinary work. It is also entirely
conceivable that, in some schools, the causal connection ran from the
promotion of university ties to the growth in legal scholarship, while in
others, the opposite is true.
In my field, corporate law, the “Law and . . .” movement dominates.
This has not always been the case. As Table 1 indicates, schools such as
Harvard that were dominated by traditional legal scholars as recently as
two decades ago are now dominated by Law and Economics scholars. A
few others, such as Duke and NYU, either remain doctrinal in
orientation, or else they are populated by heterogeneous groups of “Law
and . . .” scholars and doctrinalists.
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To this point, this Article has taken, or tried to take, a positive, rather
than a normative, approach to the issue of interdisciplinary studies. It
might be argued, as I have heard from practitioners, that legal scholars
tend to deprecate the value of traditional, doctrinal scholars. To the
contrary, the task of treating like cases alike, closely reading statutes,
pursuing legislative history, abjuring personal values, and rigorously
surveying the legal landscape in search for a coherent canon in a
particular case is a difficult and worthwhile endeavor. Furthermore,
since law schools have as their core function the education and training
of future lawyers, one cannot overemphasize the high value to be placed
on teaching such black letter law courses as well as skills classes, which
generally are regarded as doctrinal in nature.
Moreover, even if one were to take the view, as many do, that “Law
and . . .” scholarship is normatively preferable to traditional doctrinal
scholarship, the virtues of diversification suggest that having a
diversified array of offerings including, but not limited to, doctrinal and
“Law and . . .” offerings might be the preferred strategy for a law school
as a means to attract and maintain top quality students and faculty.
Finally, perhaps the most interesting finding in this Article is data
consistent with the hypothesis that law schools maximize along the
vector of quality, subject to the (limiting?) constraints imposed by the
universities in which they are situated. It appears rational, in other
words, for law schools lucky enough to be situated in great universities
to stress interdisciplinary work. In particular, it seems like a good idea
for law schools in universities with outstanding business schools to
stress law and economics in their corporate law curricula. It may also be
the case that law schools such as Northwestern or William Mitchell,
which are not physically nearby (Northwestern) or affiliated with
(William Mitchell) a major research university, should stress doctrinal
approaches to law or clinical legal studies.
My own view of legal scholarship is that quality, followed by
quantity, both are far more important than genre. Determining what
institutional environment is most likely to generate high quality and
productivity should determine the particular style of legal scholarship
that dominates the intellectual environment at a particular law school.
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